The last 15 years have seen a veritable explosion of interest in the quality of " governance" in the developing world. This very growth has driven an equally significant increase in the use of quantitative governance indicators. The first section of this paper explains the reasons for the rising interest in governance. The second section introduces the most-widely used governance indicators and briefly explains their usage. The third section attempts to explain why international organisations (IOs) devise and use crosscountry comparable governance indicators. The fourth section analyses the problems inherent in one of the most widely-used governance indicator datasets, the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) from the World Bank Institute. The fifth section attempts to explain the popularity of indicators like the WGI, and why they are frequently misused. Information was obtained from either or both questionnaires and (unstructured) interviews.
Why all the interest in governance?
In recent years, four sets of phenomena have combined to drive the explosive growth of interest in the quality of governance -and with it the use of governance indicators.
A first set of phenomena is interlinked with the spectacular growth of international investment in developing countries over the last 15 years. International investors' major newfound interest in the quality of governance in developing countries is in part simply a reflection of the significant increase in the value of their assets exposed to risk in those countries.
A second set of phenomena responsible for the increased interest in the quality of governance in developing countries derives from the end of the Cold War. Throughout the post-war period, the attitudes and behaviour of OECD governments and their national and multilateral aid agencies towards developing-country governments were dictated by the latter's position in the bi-polar world created by the Cold War. Only after the demise of the Soviet Union have these attitudes and behaviour become susceptible to real change -and increasingly so -with the perceived disappearance of the communist threat. A watershed was World Bank President James Wolfensohn' s decision in 1996 to radically reverse the Bank's longstanding policy that it could not explicitly recognize or seek to address the acute problems of corruption in many of its borrowing countries, because local politics were outside the Bank's official mandate, and to give those problems a high priority. While World Bank lending to promote economic reforms fell by 14 per cent annually between 2000 and 2004, its lending to improve governance rose by 11 per cent annually during that period, so that by 2004 25 per cent of its lending was committed to law and public administration in borrowing countries (World Bank, 2004) , Growing perceptions in recent years of a relative failure or inadequacy of policy reforms widely undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s are a third set of phenomena driving the growth of interest in governance. The widespread policy shift at that time in favour of greater " market friendliness" in developing countries -that was actively encouraged by the multilateral financial organizations (sometimes referred to as " Washington Consensus" ) that found themselves in a strong position to do so through lending conditionality -ultimately proved relatively disappointing (Easterly, 2002) . There is today a growing understanding -including within the multilateral organizations and among staunch defenders of market-friendly policy regimes -that strong markets require good governance, and that poor local governance may go far to explain the relative reform failures of the 1980s and 1990s. 2 See, for example, Williamson (2000) . Analysis of the experiences of the transition economies of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe has further strengthened this understanding (see for example, Cornia and Popov, eds., 2001 ).
Finally, a fourth set of phenomena driving the explosion of interest in governance has been the work of Douglass North and the New Institutional Economics of which he is a leading figure. This work has convincingly demonstrated the importance of a country's system of governance for the country' s success in terms of its long-term economic growth, enhancement of human welfare, and societal development (North, 1990 (North, , 2005 .
The most-widely used governance indicators
As international investors, aid donors and development analysts have increasingly come to understand the importance of governance, they have sought to render the concept operational for decision-making purposes. Following the maxim that ' you can only manage what you can measure' , they have thus turned widely to using quantitative indicators to compare the quality of governance both among countries and over time.
Investors increasingly want back-up to traditional, macroeconomic-based, country-risk indicators that have failed to predict costly financial crises. They base their investmentlocation decisions on their perceptions of governance and these perceptions are increasingly shaped by governance indicators. Bi-and multilateral donors want to identify and reward developing countries that are improving their governance -and punish those that aren' t. Many of these agencies also claim to use governance indicators to increase the transparency and consistency of their criteria for determining recipients' a i d e l i g i b i l i t y . T h e U S M i l l e n n i u m C h a l l e n g e C o r p o r a t i o n a n d t h e W o r l d B a n k ' s International Development Association each year allocate billions of dollars of aid on the basis of governance indicators. Finally, development analysts need governance indicators for their quantitative governance studies and journalists use them to report ' horse races' between countries. Thus, most users of governance indicators use them to compare the quality of governance across countries and over time.
Developing countries' own governments, business associations, NGOs and other such " internal stakeholders" who wish to bring about improvement in local governance rarely use governance indicators. They would need indicators that identify specific governance problems and monitor progress in reform with much greater precision than most currently available governance indicators. Recently, much progress has been made in the construction of governance indicators to better satisfy the needs of developing countries.
Though there are hundreds of governance indicators, a few dominate the market.
Investors, donors, journalists and development analysts rely very heavily on a small selection of composite, mostly perception-based indicators. Perception-based indicators rely on the perceptions of households, business people, civil servants or experts of the quality of governance. Facts-based indicators are derived from objective facts such as data on the existence of regulations that make it more difficult to fire employees. While the data used to construct facts-based ratings are objective, the ratings themselves are often highly subjective in both the choice of facts and the interpretation of what these facts means (e.g. " Is a low level of labour standards a hallmark of good or bad governance?" )
The most popular indicators compile a large amount of information which they reduce to a single number for a given country in a given year. It is precisely reducing the huge amount of information to a single score that makes them so attractive for decisionmaking purposes. Among the most widely-used are the so-called " World Governance Indicators" (WGIs) produced since 1996 by Daniel Kaufmann and his team at the World Bank Institute, Transparency International' s " Corruption Perceptions Index" (CPI) and the facts-based " Doing Business Indicators" from the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Also widely used (and incorporated into the " WGIs" ) are the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Freedom House' s " Political Rights" and " Civil Liberties" indicators and the Governance Indicators from the World Bank' s " Country and Policy Institutional Assessment" (CPIA). (see Hood et al, 2007, and Arndt and Oman, 2006 3 )
The World Bank therefore produces three of the most popular and influential governance 
Why do International Organisations produce governance ratings?
IOs produce and use cross-country comparable composite governance indicators to create incentives in developing countries to improve governance, to enhance the transparency and objectivity of their aid-allocation decisions, to undertake quantitative governance research, and for institutional reasons. Whether the most-widely used governance indicators fulfil these expectations is the subject of an ongoing debate. This section focuses on cross-country comparable ratings and not on country-tailored governance indicators. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for instance, is involved in country-specific governance assessments, but explicitly refrains from undertaking assessments that compare countries' governance performance, with the exception of governance related to gender equality.
Incentives for developing countries to improve their governance
Governance ratings can create incentives in developing countries to improve their governance in two ways: Through i) " naming and shaming" and " horse races" , and through ii) aid-allocation conditionality. To illustrate, Transparency International' s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was successful in drawing attention to the problem of corruption and in putting it up-front on the agenda and the WGIs triggered a " horse race"
in the media between developing countries. Governments seeking external funding also increasingly pay attention to governance ratings.
However, some developing countries' governments and scholars now increasingly tend to resist international governance ratings, according to the experience of some World Bank and UNDP staff members interviewed for this paper. They challenge the indicators for normative, legitimacy and methodological reasons. Some developing countries express their distrust to indicators that they resent as pro-liberalisation and pro-market and therefore as a continuation of the Washington Consensus. They accuse governance indicators to reflect a Western or Anglo-Saxon type of governance ideal that is not helpful to understand the governance reality in their countries (Girvan, 2002 both an incentive to have good relations with the government as well as to obtain resources for the country. Both depend on a good CPIA rating on which the country director has a high influence.
The lack of " actionability" , transparency and comparability over time of the most-widely used governance indicators is a further hindering factor in pressuring developing countries into improving their governance. Several World Bank economists, who work in country offices, said that they were unable to fulfil the requests of developing countries gov ernm en ts to ex pl ai n to th em th ei r rati n gs on th e W GIs. Many of th e IO staf f , interviewed, who are working directly in developing countries, said they do not use broad governance indicators like the WGIs on the ground: Some staff felt that it is difficult to start a policy-oriented debate in their country on the basis of broad composite indicators and some resented the stigmatization of countries through international governance ratings. Others found the indicators useful to raise awareness of governance problems in countries where the government is not very willing to reform and to start a dialogue with the government. Both more specific cross-country comparable indicators as well as intodepth assessments in a country -for instance the World Bank Institute' s Governance Diagnostic Surveys 4 -were cited by IO country office staff as useful for governance reform.
Higher transparency of aid-allocation decisions
Donors are increasingly aware of the lack of good governance in their own aid-allocation processes and, therefore, consider governance indicators a tool to enhance the objectivity and transparency of those decisions. Paradoxically, the indicators they use lack just that transparency and contain hidden biases, as will be explained in the next section of the paper.
Quantitative governance analysis
IOs also produce and use governance indicators for quantitative governance analysis to enlighten the governance-development relationship. Studies that ascertain evidence for a positive impact of good governance on economic growth or on the efficient use of development aid serve as a justification for spending money on governance reform in developing countries (for instance Burnside and Dollar, 1997 , Knack and Keefer, 1995 or Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002 . These studies were crucial in the change of agenda towards governance reforms in developing countries.
Yet researchers' use of governance indicators is widely plagued with pitfalls, as the nature and limitations of composite governance indicators unfortunately weaken the rigour and the credibility of many studies. The next part will illustrate some technical and conceptual problems with the example of the WGIs which are used frequently in academic studies.
Institutional reasons
A number of institutional reasons reinforced the rise of governance indicators in IOs.
First of all, governance indicators give institutions a profile. It is a product that is very visible within and outside the organisation. Secondly, if a leading actor adopts a new policy, other actors are likely to follow independent of its efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) . The World Bank produced and used governance indicators and many other development agencies and Ios like the the OECD and the Asian Development Bank followed. They followed, because i) governance indicators are " trendy" and ii) because they aimed at improving upon existing measurements or complementing them with different measurements. Thirdly, visible work on the increasingly important issue of measuring governance can help units within an international organisation to obtain a more important role. Dunleavy' s (1991) bureau-shaping model predicts that bureaucrats would prefer to work in small, elite agencies close to political power centres and doing interesting work, rather than to run large-budget agencies with many staff but also many risks and problems.
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The increase in the number of producers of indicators has had a positive effect on the quality and diversity of governance indicators available. To illustrate, in response to a previous lack of data several new initiatives (e.g. DIAL' s household surveys) produce indicators that reflect the experiences of the poor, and other initiatives try to produce more transparent indicators (e.g. Global Integrity). However, it is difficult for new initiatives like Global Integrity and DIAL to gain attention, because the most-widely used indicators are well-established and dominate the market. The success of the most-widely used indicators has created interests which make it more difficult to move on to new developments. The development of more (context) specific indicators would shift more responsibility to the staff working " on the ground" , away from the headquarters.
The downside of the " measuring governance trend" is that organisations spend large amounts of money on assessing governance, while the funds might, in some cases, be better used elsewhere. Jak Jabes (2002), Director of the Governance and Regional
Cooperation Division at the Asian Development Bank, cautioned: " Governance indicators are ultimately useful if they can be utilized to mobilize the leaders of a country to bring about change. If, as I unfortunately think is happening, indicators become an end in themselves, then they end up becoming part of dust-gathering reports and detract attention from a less complicated yet more practical and productive approach" .
The World Bank Institute' s "World Governance Indicators"
The six WGIs, namely " Voice and Accountability" , " Political Stability" , " Government Effectiveness" , " Regulatory Quality" , " Rule of Law" and " Control of Corruption" , are the most popular governance indicators. Publicly available and easily accessible on the web, they are widely-used to compare the quality of governance over time and across countries, for aid-allocation decisions, for risk ratings, for academic analysis and for media articles. They summarize data from more than 30 expert assessments and household and firm surveys, and are available from 1996 to today for more than 200
countries.
According to one of the authors 6 , the WGIs were created in response to four inter-related concerns: One was the apparent lack of robustness of cross-country comparisons using different individual data sources, especially when the different sources led to different conclusions. Second was concern about how to interpret cross-country differences and their statistical and practical significance. Third was concern that it is difficult to compare results from regional surveys with broader cross-country surveys. A fourth concern was to find a way to produce useful overarching, integrative or summary indicators, given the large and growing diversity of individual sources cropping up in different pieces of research and in policy debates.
While the WGIs are a very useful first snapshot of experts' perceptions of a country' s quality of governance, users often fail to take into account their limitations for crosscountry and over time comparisons. This section will briefly explain five interrelated concerns with the indicators that users are often not aware of: i) lack of transparency, ii)
absence of an underlying theory of good governance, iii) hidden bias, iv) lack of comparability over time and v) lack of actionability. The interested reader can find a more exhaustive discussion in Arndt and Oman (2006) .
The Transparency Paradox
Some donors have come to give high importance to the use of relatively untransparent indicators like the WGI or the CPI in, paradoxically, trying to give transparency to their aid-allocation decisions. The reasons for the WGI' s lack of transparency are threefold: i) high complexity, ii) lack of reproducibility, iii) lack of underlying theory of governance.
First of all, the sheer number and diversity of indicators, produced by others, that are incorporated into a single WGI make it very difficult to understand a country' s rating, as illustrated in Figure 1 for " Regulatory Quality" in Bangladesh 1998 and 2005. At the tip 6 We thank Aart Kraay for this information of the pyramid is the rating for Regulatory Quality of Bangladesh. Underneath are the sources -surveys or expert assessments -from which that rating is calculated. Most sources are themselves composite indicators, constructed from experts' , business' and households' answers to survey questions or checklists (lower part of the pyramid).
Understanding a change in a country' s rating over time or a cross-country difference is complicated, because the composition and weights of primary sources vary across countries and over time. 7 To illustrate, Knack (2006) Kaufmann et al. publish only the overall rating of each primary source in rescaled form.
Thirdly, the WGIs lack any underlying theory of good or bad governance that would explain the meaning of the indicators.
7 In addition to each country' s rating, Kaufmann et al. provide so-called " margins of error" to estimate the reliability of the rating. They construct 90 % confidence intervals on the basis of these margins of error around a country' s rating which, according to their estimate, has a 90 per cent probability of containing the country' s " true" (as opposed to estimated) score. 
Absence of an underlying theory of good governance
It is important to remember that all rating systems are normative by their very nature.
They imply a judgement, if they rate one country better than another country. One might, therefore, expect the WGIs to be based on a normative definition or concept of what constitutes good or bad governance which determines the countries' ratings. However, there is no such normative concept or theory underlying the WGI ratings. The authors define these ratings simply as " the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised" . They further disaggregate the channels into different components, yet they do not explain how to distinguish between good or bad governance.
On the contrary, it' s the compilation of all the ratings from different sources brought together in a single " WGI" which gives normative meaning to the concept of governance.
But nobody, including the authors themselves, can define these norms. In addition, the norms differ from year to year and from country to country, because the sources for the WGIs, as for the CPI from Transparency International, differ across countries and over time.
Melissa Thomas (2007) finds no evidence for the construct validity of the WGIs. She concludes that the " indicators stand as an elaborate and unsupported hypothesis" and that " accordingly, reliance on the indicators is premature" (p.2) Furthermore, rating countries on " true governance" implies that there is only one, " true" , system of good governance. One may wonder about the nature of the opposite, " untrue governance," and whether a single governance system should be imposed on the developing world. Meisel (2004) explains why " Anglo-Saxon glasses" do not help to explain the rapid growth in the Asian economies and offers a new model of " Governance
Cultures" , helpful for developing countries today.
Hidden bias
The problem is not so much that there is bias in a given WGI indicator. Every governance indicator that ranks countries will be biased, because every rating of a country is based on norms and preferences that are not necessarily shared worldwide. The problem is that the biases remain largely hidden from users, as the more than thirty sources, many of which lack transparency themselves, determine the normative meaning of the indicators.
Regulations to protect the environment and labour rights tend to be interpreted as less weight to perceptions that diverge from the dominant majority than to perceptions that conform to the majority view. Household surveys diverge from the majority of expert perceptions, and therefore, get low weights. The reason for this divergence is not necessarily that either household surveys or expert assessments are wrong, but could also be that they assess different aspects of governance. To come back to our previous example, the crime rate and protection (or abuse) by the police and judiciary are not necessarily at the same level for the poor parts of a city and the diplomatic and business parts. However, Kaufmann et al. assume that the discrepancy between Gallup' s rating and the majority of expert ratings is due to its high measurement error and discard the possibility that it measures something different.
Lack of comparability over time
The WGI should not be used for direct comparisons of levels of governance over time. The last paragraph highlighted, with the example of the WGIs, the limitations of the most popular governance indicators, all of them highly aggregated summary measurements, and Arndt and Oman (2006) showed that these indicators are often not correctly used.
11 To illustrate, Guatemala' s rating on Regulatory Quality worsened considerably from 1998 to 2005. The rating for 1998 was based on three sources and the rating for 2005 on eight sources, among them the three original sources from 1998. The rating of one of these three sources, the CPIA, is not publicly available for 1998. The other two sources that are available for both years actually rated the country better in 2005 than in 1998. The deterioration in Guatemala' s rating from 1998 to 2005 was, hence, very likely driven by the additional sources for the 2005 rating (example based on data from Kaufmann et al., 2006) Why are these indicators so popular despite their shortcomings? Why do donors, investors and analysts use such indicators for purposes they are not designed for?
The following four major reasons lie behind the market domination of a small number of composite indicators and their misuse: i) users do not understand the limitations of the indicators, ii) complex composite indicators meet an important demand for summary measurements of the quality of governance, iii) users follow other users, and iv) users perceive that there is no alternative.
Incomplete understanding of indicators' limitations
Users Furthermore, understanding the complicated methodological background paper of, for instance, the WGIs requires not only time, but also an advanced level of statistical expertise that many users, often generalists or experts in other fields, lack. Some users might trust in the reliability of the indicators precisely because they are impressed by the equations and tests in the background papers that they do not fully understand.
Secondly, some users think that relying on a large number of different sources eliminates the bias inherent in individual sources. The normative content and bias is often hidden and users are therefore not aware that they may not share the norms inherent in the indicators.
Thirdly, non-statistical experts often tend to believe that numbers are facts. As soon as a governance assessment is quantitative, the assessment is believed to be objective.
Numbers reassure and create the impression of indisputable facts.
Fourthly, misleading advertising contributes to a considerable misperception and therefore misuse of governance indicators. While Transparency International carefully advertises its CPI as " a snapshot of the views of business people and country analysts, with less of a focus on year-to-year trends" , the World Bank Institute advertises its WGIs as " reliable measurements of governance" . Presentations and its website also create the misleading impression that the views of ordinary citizens are well-represented, making the indicators particularly attractive to donor agencies that seek to improve the living conditions of the poor. To illustrate, Kaufmann et al.(2007) heavily emphasize the recent inclusion of the source " Gallup World Poll " , a cross-country household survey available for a large number of countries. What they do not emphasize in the paper is that Gallup' s World Poll gets zero weight on two WGIs, marginal weight on two other WGIs and provides no data for the remaining two.
Fifthly, users often do not fully understand or ignore warnings of the producers to make cross-country and over-time comparisons only with due caution. To illustrate, Kaufmann et al. very carefully flag many cross-country differences or over-time changes in the WGIs as " statistically insignificant" , a warning that is often ignored, in particular in newspaper articles. Journalists may ignore these warnings on purpose, because taking them into account would make their article too complicated and less interesting, or they may not be familiar with the concept of statistical significance themselves.
Supply meets demand for summary measurements
There is a high-demand from development agencies, ministries, IOs, international banks and the media for summary measurements of the quality of governance with broad country coverage. Summary measurements are convenient for busy decision-makers.
They are quick to look at and therefore help to make quick decisions, compared to looking at hundreds of different indicators 13 or qualitative reports.
Using a summary measurement of most available sources frees decision-makers and development researchers from i) getting lost in the complexity of governance and ii) making explicit normative choices that could render them vulnerable to criticism. To illustrate, Steven de Walle (2007) shows that concepts used in evaluating the performance of public services appear to be neutral, but are generally value-laden.
Protecting public-service values such as universal access to services, including remote areas, can come at the sacrifice of efficiency and there is no neutral answer to what is more important. Similarly, most donors or academics agree that the quality of regulations should be good. The disagreement arises as soon as they try to specify what regulations are a sign of good quality: Are environmental regulations deemed ' good' because they protect the environment and the health of the population, or should they considered to be ' bad' , because it puts businesses under too much financial and administrative strain to comply with them? Most people also agree that governments should protect the freedom of the press, but they may disagree on the specific weight that different aspects of press freedom should carry in a " Press Freedom Index" .
To illustrate, what weight should be given to an indicator assessing the number of journalists who were killed in a given country, over an indicator that assesses ownership concentration in the media sector?
Faced with the complexity of governance, difficult normative choices and high timepressure, it is not surprising that decision-makers and development analysts often opt for well-known and widely-used summary measurements.
One of the World Bank staff members interviewed for this paper said that such measurements help to " avoid the hard part of development, which is working out where and how to assist" and that providing such governance indicator rankings to governments " conveys no more information than just saying to them ' you must develop' " .
Media
The media extensively uses and publishes ratings, because ratings sell. US New for instance generated a lot of publicity over its annual ranking of colleges and universities and continues to publish the ratings, despite protests of American Universities about the arbitrariness of these indicators. The controversy is similar to the controversy over the CPI and the WGIs. 
Herd behaviour
Governance Indicators obtain authority through the number and importance of users.
Other users, therefore, often serve as a justification for someone' s own use. To illustrate, the authors of the IMF Country Report on Albania (2006) first describe the limitations of the WGI and then proceed to say " However, the government (… ) recognises that the World Bank governance indicators are generally accepted internationally."
Perceived absence of an alternative
Many users perceive that there is no alternative to the most-widely used governance
indicators. The reason is threefold: first of all, many alternative governance indicators are only available for a limited number of countries, whereas indicators such as the WGI draw their utility precisely from the fact that they use all available information to obtain a rating for almost all countries in the world. Secondly, users are likely to think that the more sources a composite indicator uses, the more reliable its rating will be. Thirdly, users may not even know about innovative approaches to quantify the quality of governance, because the media focuses its attention on established indicators like Transparency International' s CPI.
Alternatives
There are several alternatives to relying heavily on a few summary measurements of the quality of governance. In the short-run, users can find advice and guidance about the measurements that will most likely suit their purposes in governance indicator guides and inventories (IADB, 2007 , UNDP, 2007 , Metagora, 2007 , World Bank Institute, 2007 , Besancon, 2003 . These are useful: i) to gain awareness of and profit from the wealth of In the medium-to long run, the trend towards more specific, meaningful and actionable indicators will continue. While we do not have at our disposal a theory of governance a b l e t o g u i d e t h e m e a n i n g f u l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f i n d i c a t o r s o f t h e o v e r a l l q u a l i t y o f governance, some aspects of governance are well understood and indicators can therefore be based on theory. These more specific indicators are often also composite indicators, but differ from opaque summary measurements in that both the choice of the indicators and the weighting is transparent and based on theory. An illustration is the multi-agency " Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Program" (PEFA) that rates countries on their public management performance in a transparent manner, publishing the results along with detailed explanations for countries' ratings.
Quantifying the quality of governance in a transparent and specific way and trying to make indicators " actionable" forces development analysts to face the limits of their Many users are often not aware of the wealth of information available and that they can find advice and guidance about the measurements that best suit their purposes in governance indicator guides and inventories (IADB, 2007 , UNDP, 2007 , Metagora, 2007 , World Bank Institute, 2007 , Besancon, 2003 . New, more specific and transparent initiatives have emerged in recent years. Some provide comparable data for a large number of countries and others are more context-specific. What they have in common is that they do not claim to assess the quality of overall governance, but focus on specific and well-defined aspects of governance and, therefore, give guidance to developing countries on how to improve their rating. Until we have at our disposal a theory of governance able to guide the construction of meaningful indicators of the overall quality of governance, the development community should focus on such specific and welldefined indicators. As with all indicators, these new indicators have their limitations; however, since they are transparent, their limitations are also transparent, hence reducing the danger of misinterpretation and misuse. 1
Bangladesh Regulatory Quality 1998
Lower layer
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations --Exports: A 2% reduction in export volume as a result of a worsening in export regulations or restrictions (such as export limits) during any 12-month period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.(Global Insight Global Risk Service) Policies Non-Tax: Regulations --Imports: A 2% reduction in import volume as a result of a worsening in import regulations or restrictions (such as import quotas) during any 12-month period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.(Global Insight Global Risk Service) Policies Non-Tax: Regulations --Other Business: An increase in other regulatory burdens, with respectto the level at the time of the assessment, that reduces total aggregate investment in real LCU terms by 10% (Global Insight Global Risk Service) Policies Non-Tax: Ownership of Business by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership of business by non-residents during any 12-month period. (Global Insight Global Risk Service) Policies Non-Tax: Ownership of Equities by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership of equities by non-residents during any 12-month period. (Global Insight Global Risk Service) Tax Effectiveness: How efficient the country' s tax collection system is. The rules may be clear and transparent, but whether they are enforced consistently. This factor looks at the relative effectiveness too of corporate and personal, indirect and direct taxation. Based on Kaufmann et al. (2006) No. Author(s) Title
